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The economic stagnation in the 1990s in Japan posed a serious challenge to the practice of 
“lifetime employment.”  Despite pessimistic predictions, however, empirical studies have found 
no major changes to the practice pertaining to core employees.  Why does lifetime employment 
persist in Japan?  This paper develops a conceptual framework motivated by personnel economics 
and sociology and explores the persistence and stability of Japanese lifetime employment from a 
historical perspective. 
In this paper, we view lifetime employment as a set of interdependent human resource 
management (HRM) practices surrounding an implicit and long-term employment contract.  We 
further examine these firm-level practices within the context of an employment system in which 
micro-level practices interact with macro-level institutions.  Using this framework, we study the 
formation and transformation of lifetime employment, focusing on key historical events such as 
the Great Depression, Postwar Occupation, High Growth, Oil Crisis, and the Post-Bubble 
stagnation. 
Our analysis shows that lifetime employment is a product of dynamic interactions among 
labor, management, and government in response to changing environment.  The practice evolved 
gradually into a cluster of HRM policies, which was further reinforced by the endogenous 
formation of labor laws, state welfare system, and social norms.   As a result, today’s Japanese 
lifetime employment is deeply embedded into complementary practices and institutions, resulting 
in its resilience and stability.  The paper concludes by offering some insights into the future 
course of Japanese lifetime employment.   2
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1. Introduction 
Sociologists and economists have long recognized the employment security and corporate 
loyalty shared by white-collar and blue-collar employees in large firms as a uniquely Japanese 
institution (Abegglen 1958; Dore 1973; Shirai 1983; Koike 1988).  At the same time, many 
scholars have predicted the demise of so-called Japanese lifetime employment in the past.  
Cole (1971) argued that it was not sustainable under high economic growth, as chronic labor 
shortages would raise employees’ outside options who would then be tempted to move from 
one job to another.    Beck and Beck (1994) and others predicted that the economic slowdown 
in the 1990s coupled by the globalization of financial markets would change managerial 
incentives.  Infusion of foreign capital and necessity of rationalization, they argued, would 
promote American-style personnel practices, such as layoffs, performance pay, and mid-
career hiring, and undermine the precarious equilibrium between management and labor.     
Contrary to the scholarly predictions and journalistic reports, empirical studies have so 
far detected no major changes in the practice of lifetime employment pertaining to “core” 
employees.  Although quantifying the extent of lifetime employment has been difficult due 
to the lack of a simple empirical definition, for one measure, the proportion of long-tenure 
workers (ten years or longer) in Japan averaged 43 percent in the 1990s, while the same 
proportion in the U.S. was 26 percent (Auer and Cazes 2000).  Following up the study by 
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), Kato (2001) shows that ten-year job retention rates of core 
male employees (age 30 to 44 with more than 5 years of tenure) changed little from the 1977-
87 period to 1987-97 period.
1  Tsuru (2002) documents that the ratios of long-term male 
employees to total workforce increased in the 1980s and remained stable throughout the 
1990s at firms of all sizes.
2  Labor turnover data confirm these observations.  As Figure 1 
shows, the establishment-level separation rates of manufacturing workers declined 
                                                 
1 A ten-year job retention rate is a ratio of workers employed by the same firm after ten years to an initial 
number of workers. 
2 See also Chuma (1998) and Rebick (2001) for similar empirical assessments.   3
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considerably during the high growth period (1960-75) and remained low thereafter, with only 
a mild upward trend since 1996.    Note that the data cover smaller establishments (employing 
30 or more workers) as well as female employees for which lifetime employment has been 
less prevalent.    Moreover, “separations” in the data include intra-firm transfers of employees 
across establishments, a common employment adjustment method to avoid dismissals.     
Why does lifetime employment persist in Japan?  Why do we not observe a drastic 
institutional change despite the more-than-a-decade-long economic stagnation?  The first 
objective of this paper is to introduce a conceptual framework motivated by personnel 
economics and sociology to study the stability and persistence of Japanese lifetime 
employment.  In light of recent advances in personnel economics, we characterize today’s 
lifetime employment as a cluster of human resource management (HRM) practices that 
constitute a self-enforcing equilibrium.  We also examine these practices within the context 
of the Japanese economic system in which firm-level practices interact with macro-level legal, 
political, and social institutions.  The second objective of this paper is to apply this 
framework to a historical analysis and investigate the formation and transformation of lifetime 
employment over the last several decades. 
What can history tell us?  Our analysis delivers two main messages. First, Japanese 
lifetime employment is a product of dynamic interactions among management, labor, and 
government in response to changing environments.  As such, the practice evolved into a set 
of sophisticated and interdependent HRM practices.  Second, the firm-level practices were 
reinforced by the endogenous formation of macro-level institutions, such as labor laws, state 
welfare policies, and social norms.  As a consequence, today’s lifetime employment is 
deeply embedded into complementary practices and institutions, resulting in its resilience and 
stability.     4
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 lays out a conceptual 
framework.  Section 3 presents a historical analysis, documenting the evolution of Japanese 
lifetime employment.  Section 4 speculates the future course of lifetime employment, and 
the last section concludes. 
 
2. Re-conceptualizing Lifetime Employment 
Recent literature in personnel economics has emphasized a complementarity among HRM 
practices, the property defined by the increasing marginal benefits of some practices in the 
usage of others.
3   Since the early 1980s, a number of American manufacturing firms 
introduced aspects of Japanese-style HRM practices, such as small group activities and 
flexible job assignments, to improve labor productivity.  In many instances, their 
experiments failed (Brown and Reich 1989; Osterman 1994).  These and other observations 
stimulated the theoretical literature that underscores the importance of adopting a set of HRM 
practices at once as opposed to a piecemeal introduction of a few (e.g. Kanemoto and 
MacLeod 1992; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1995).    Although empirical identification of complementarities proved to be difficult, 
using micro survey data, a growing number of studies find evidence in support of the theory 
(e.g. MacDuffie 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Kato and Morishima 2002).  
In light of these advances, we re-conceptualize lifetime employment as a cluster of 
complementary HRM practices. 
Lifetime employment commonly refers to long-term employment contracts (i.e., 
indefinite contracts specifying no fixed duration) with an implicit handshake between 
employers and regular employees.  Since Japan’s statutory laws stipulate that either party 
can terminate such contracts at any time with a short advance notice, the contracts have to be 
                                                 
3 See Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a comprehensive literature review.   5
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internally enforced, that is, there must be an incentive for both management and workers to 
conform to their promise.
4  Observe, however, that long-term employment is intrinsically 
fragile as any changes in product or labor market conditions would affect ex post incentive of 
one of the two parties.  For example, during economic prosperity workers have a greater 
incentive to leave their firms, while during recessions employers have a stronger incentive to 
renege on their promises.    So what makes long-term employment contracts self-enforcing? 
In practice, the following areas in HRM are found critical in supporting lifetime 
employment in Japanese firms (Koike 1988; Shimada 1988; Sako and Sato 1997; Tachibanaki 
and Noda 2000; Kato 2000): (1) human capital development that raises an employee’s 
productivity over his tenure and provides managerial incentives to retain the employee, e.g. 
corporate training, job rotations, small group activities such as quality circles; (2) 
compensation system that provides incentives for employees to exert effort, acquire desirable 
human capital, and remain with the firm, e.g. seniority-plus-merit wage, internal promotion, 
bonuses, corporate pensions; (3) employment adjustment methods that protect the level of 
employment, while providing management with alternative ways to reduce labor costs during 
business downturns,  e.g. hiring freeze, intra- and inter-firm transfers, voluntary retirement; 
and (4) internal enforcement and coordination mechanisms that facilitate information sharing, 
enable employees to monitor management, and encourage labor-management cooperation, e.g. 
enterprise unions, join labor-management committees, workplace socialization.  In short, 
today’s lifetime employment consists of a set of sophisticated and interdependent HRM 
practices that encompasses multiple aspects of work organization and labor-management 
relations.  
In our framework, we further embed micro-level HRM practices within the broader 
context of an employment system of the Japanese economy (Aoki 1990; Moriguchi 2000).  
                                                 
4 As we discuss in detail later, there has been a development of case law precedents that restrict employers’ right 
of dismissal to a certain degree.   6
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Following Coleman (1990), we conceptualize lifetime employment as an outcome of the 
long-run interactions between micro- and macro-level institutions.  At the macro-level, the 
government designs labor market regulations, union laws, and social welfare policies that 
impact incentives of labor and management.
5  Although these macro-level institutions are 
exogenous to individual employers and workers, in the long run, they are endogenously 
shaped as they interact with micro-level institutions.   For example, dominant HRM 
practices influence government policies as they create or eliminate demand for particular laws 
or regulations.  Similarly, we claim that social norms – notably loyalty, trust, and 
commitment that are often assumed to be fixed cultural traits – evolve endogenously as they 
are nurtured by micro-level economic and social exchange relations.    In general, the long-run 
interactions between management, labor, and the government give rise to a stable 
employment  system, in which micro-level institutions and macro-level institutions are 
complementary to one another.     
In the following historical analysis, we focus on major historical events – the Great 
Depression, the Postwar Occupational Reforms, the High Growth period, the Oil Shock, and 
the Post-Bubble stagnation – and document how they shaped and transformed lifetime 
employment in Japan. 
 
3. The Creation and Transformation of Lifetime Employment 
3.1    Corporate Welfarism and the Challenge of the Great Depression 
Lifetime employment traced its origins to corporate welfarism that emerged during the 
interwar period (Hyodo 1971; Hazama 1978; Gordon 1985; Moriguchi 2000).    World War I 
(1914-18) brought about a rapid growth of heavy industries and a shortage of skilled labor 
force.  Moreover, as mechanization advanced and firms grew larger, production technology 
                                                 
5 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, other institutions, such as corporate governance and supplied 
relations also affect the feasibility and effectiveness of HRM practices.  See, for example, Aoki (1988) and 
Nishiguchi (1994).    7
7  
and work organization became increasingly firm-specific.  To train and retain skilled 
workers (jukuren-ko), who were well-known for their footlooseness and lack of corporate 
loyalty, major employers began introducing a variety of HRM practices (Kyochokai 1924).   
In particular, leading firms set up corporate apprenticeship schools rather than relying 
on public vocational schools, and gradually reduced mid-career hiring in favor of workers 
trained in-house. Initially, however, a majority of apprentices left their employers after, if not 
during, a training period for better wage offers (Hyodo 1971, p.407; Hazama 1978, p.513).  
To reduce labor turnover, which often exceeded an annual rate of 80 percent during the 1910s, 
employers introduced pecuniary incentives, such as service bonuses, periodic pay raises, and 
retirement allowances, which were previously offered only to white-collar employees, to 
blue-collar workers.  Management awarded pay raises to a fixed percentage of workers 
based on their merit and length of service, and instituted retirement allowances whose amount 
increased with the years of service.  Compared to the postwar practices, however, the 
amount and coverage of these benefits were small and their payments irregular (Showa 
Dojinkai 1960, pp.265-80).   
In response to the surge of the labor movement in the late 1910s, leading employers 
also introduced plant-level employee representation or “factory councils” to facilitate labor-
management communication and preempt employee discontent (Kyochokai 1926).   Unlike 
enterprise unions in the postwar period, these councils consisted exclusively of blue-collar 
employees, reflecting a sharp status distinction between blue-collar and white-collar 
employees within an establishment during the prewar period.  Moreover, in most cases, 
management restricted the subjects of council meetings to issues such as health, safety, 
recreation, and efficiency improvements, refusing to discuss wages, hours, and benefits.   
Early corporate welfarism was confined to a minority of prosperous employers in the 
economy – such as Mitsubishi Shipyards, Sumitomo Metals, Hitachi Engineering, Nippon   8
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Electric, and Yahata Ironworks – consisting of no more than a few hundred large private and 
state-owned establishments mostly in capital-intensive industries.  The number of 
establishments instituting factory councils, for example, was fewer than 200 throughout the 
1920s (Kyochokai 1929, Chapter 9).  Although the HRM practices became less erratic and 
more systematized among these establishments during the interwar period, employers retained 
full discretion over qualifying or disqualifying individual employees as well as modifying or 
discontinuing the practices at will with legal impunity.  In the word of a contemporary 
government official, the vaunted corporate welfarism rested entirely on “the whims of 
capitalists” (Garon 1988, p.172).   
The Japanese economy was troubled by successive downturns in the interwar period, 
including the 1921 post-WWI recession, the 1923 Kanto Great Earthquake, and the 1926 
Financial Crisis.    The largest shock was the Great Depression of 1929-31 during which time 
the nation’s industrial production declined by 8 percent.  Numerous firms, including largest 
employers, reduced wages, cancelled benefits, and undertook large-scale layoffs.  The level 
of employment fell by more than 8 percent in 1929-31.    In protest, workers organized strikes 
and public demonstrations.  In 1930 alone, more than eight hundred disputes broke out 
involving 72,000 workers, and over one million working days were lost (see Figure 2).  The 
surge of labor disputes prompted the government to exhort business leaders not to dismiss 
workers en masse for fear of widespread unemployment and social disorder.  Workers’ 
protest and government pressure urged management to develop measures to avoid dismissals.   
Two major methods of employment adjustment, which became common practices after WWII, 
emerged during the interwar period. 
First, when dismissals became inevitable, major employers solicited workers to accept 
voluntary retirement (kibo taishoku) in exchange for augmented retirement allowance.  
Although voluntary retirement was de facto dismissal, management consulted employees in   9
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advance and the sum of retirement allowance received by the employees, which increased 
with their length of tenure, was nontrivial (Shakaikyoku 1936).
6  The practice of voluntary 
retirement was often effective in moderating workers’ discontent and helped maintain 
cooperative relations between management and remaining employees (Gordon 1985, p.201; 
Nishinarita  1988,  pp.183-92).   
Second, large firms began to use temporary workers (rinji-ko) as a buffer to insulate 
core employees from business fluctuations.   Previously, temporary workers were commonly 
promoted to regular worker status after a short probationary period.  During the interwar 
period, however, the status of temporary workers became fixed indefinitely.  They were 
hired under short-term renewable contracts and let go first when business conditions 
deteriorated.  As management disqualified temporary workers from retirement allowance 
plans, the cost of dismissing them was significantly lower than dismissing regular workers 
(Hyodo 1971, p.430; Hazama 1978, p.498).   
To summarize, during the interwar period, leading employers introduced a set of HRM 
practices, such as company training, incentive pay, plant-level employee representation, and 
employment security, to foster core skilled workers.  Workers’ protest against employment 
reduction and the elimination of benefits, together with government intermediation during 
labor disputes, gradually established an expectation that these benefits were part of the “just 
reward” that could not be withdrawn at management’s will (Gordon 1985, pp.196-206).  In 
response, management developed methods of adjusting employment to mitigate the cost of 
long-term commitment in business downturns.  As Figure 1 shows, separation rates of 
production workers declined from over 60% in the early 1920s to below 50% in the late 1930s, 
part of which may be attributed to the spread of corporate welfarism.  Although a vast 
                                                 
6 For instance, in 1932 a male employee in a large establishment with 10 years of tenure received the average 
retirement allowance worth 150 days’ wages plus 30 days’ pay in case of voluntary retirement (Zensanren 1936a, 
1932b; Moriguchi 2003).   10
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majority of workers in the economy remained highly mobile, a set of stable and loyal workers 
began to emerge in leading firms. 
Reflecting the development in firm-level HRM practices, complementary labor laws 
began to take shape during the 1930s (Moriguchi 2003, pp.31-33).    First, prompted by rising 
unemployment, the government proposed a national unemployment insurance bill in 1932.  
In the legislative process, however, the bill was transformed into law that incorporated an 
aspect of unemployment insurance into corporate welfare practices. The law mandated every 
employer (with 30 or more workers) to establish a retirement allowance fund for an employee 
and pay an allowance in case of separation.  Affirming prevailing HRM practices, the law 
permitted employers to vary an amount of the allowance depending on an employee’s length 
of service and the reason for separation.  After the enactment of the law in 1936, retirement 
allowance plans diffused to smaller-sized establishments in the economy.   
Second, despite repeated legislative attempts by progressive politicians and 
government officials, trade union law never materialized in the prewar period.  Business 
leaders strongly opposed union legislation throughout the period, claiming that factory 
councils provided employees with a form of employee representation that were more 
conducive to “labor-capital cooperation (roshi kyocho)” than trade unions.    Although factory 
councils did not give independent voice to workers, evidence indicates that organized labor 
failed to gain workers’ support in large firms that instituted corporate weflarism.    As Figure 
2 shows, the absence of legal protection notwithstanding, trade unions organized more than 
900 establishments and 400,000 workers by the mid-1930s. All major firms, however, 
remained nonunion.  Trade unions were dissolved by the military government after the 
Japanese invasion of China in 1937.
7  
 
                                                 
7 For the evolution of corporate HRM practices during WWII and the impact of wartime labor regulations, 
readers are referred to Okazaki (1993) and Moriguchi (2000).    11
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3.2 Postwar Occupational Reforms and the Turbulent Years 
Immediately after Japan's surrender in 1945, the nation was placed under the indirect 
governance of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).  Even before the 
enactment of the Trade Union Law, which recognized workers’ right to bargain collectively 
for the first time, there was an explosion of the labor movement led by Japanese workers 
under the slogan of “democratization of management.”  Union density (the percentage of 
union membership in the total labor force) rose to 41 percent by 1946, compared to the 
prewar peak of 8 percent (see Figure 2).  In many cases, workers spontaneously formed 
what they called “employee unions (jugyoin kumiai)” that consisted of white-collar and blue-
collar employees within an establishment or a company.    In contrast to the prewar industrial 
relations, newly established unions forcefully demanded the equal treatment of all employees, 
contractual employment guarantee, and direct participation in management in order to 
improve their status, welfare, and bargaining power.  The labor movement quickly 
radicalized under the leadership of the Congress of Industrial Unions, often resorting to 
collective violence against managers during labor disputes.     
While management was paralyzed by economic disorder and political turmoil, many 
employee unions won extremely favorable contracts during 1945-49 that stipulated generous 
wage increases, a variety of welfare benefits, and employment security (Gordon 1985, p.345).   
By 1950, a large majority of large firms (with 500 or more employees) instituted major 
corporate welfare programs (see Table 1).    Many unions also won a “union shop” provision 
that required every regular employee of a company to be a union member, and in exchange, 
management won a clause requiring every union member to be an employee of the company.   
This exclusive employee membership later became a hallmark of enterprise unionism.    As a 
dramatic symbol of labor victory, major unions also won pure “seniority wages” in which 
wages were determined based on employees’ age, tenure, and family conditions, rejecting any   12
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merit-based components insisted by employers.
8  Labor's initial victory, however, was soon 
challenged by management's counteroffensive. 
In 1949, the SCAP implemented a drastic deflationary policy to bring the Japanese 
economy under free market mechanisms, plunging it into a sharp recession.  As generous 
government subsidies suddenly disappeared, many companies faced a choice between drastic 
rationalization and bankruptcy.  The 1949-50 recession thus posed a serious challenge to 
long-term employment.    Unions fiercely opposed rationalization plans, demanding complete 
withdrawal of proposed mass dismissals (Gordon 1985, pp.388-90).  A sense of mutual 
mistrust between labor and management grew.  The most violent labor disputes in Japanese 
history took place between 1949 and 1954, involving major companies, such as Toshiba, 
Hitachi, Toyota, and Nissan.  As Figure 2 shows, the working days lost in 1952 reached 
unprecedented 15 million days involving 1.6 million workers.     
In almost all major strikes, management eventually prevailed (Yamamoto 1991).  
During prolonged disputes, radical union leaders typically lost support from core employees 
of the company who instead formed or joined the “second union (daini kumiai).”  
Management concluded an agreement with the second union, expelled the radical leaders, and 
undertook dismissals by a familiar method of voluntary retirement and augmented dismissal 
compensation.  During the process, unions learned a hard lesson that their unrestrained 
demands might be unsustainable in the face of economic reality.  Employers also learned 
that rationalization measures could provoke costly labor disputes.  The second unions 
became the foundation for enterprise unionism characterized by labor-management 
cooperation in pursuit of corporate goals that took roots in most large Japanese firms in the 
following decade (Shirai 1992).   
                                                 
8 In the 1960s, however, employers promoted ability-based wages to provide work incentives.  By the early 
1970s, a majority of firms adopted hybrid wages or “seniority-plus-merit” pay that combined seniority with a 
prominent merit component based on performance evaluation by supervisors (Tsutsui 1998, p.174).   13
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Contrary to popular belief, there was no statutory law that guaranteed lifetime 
employment in Japan.  The Japanese Civil Code stipulated that, under an employment 
contract with no fixed duration, either party can terminate the contract at any time with a two-
week advance notice (Article 627(1)).  The Labor Standard Law of 1947 obligated 
employers to pay the equivalent of thirty days' wages when dismissing an employee (Article 
20). Except for those restrictions, the legal codes supported the employers’ right to dismiss 
employees.  As Table 2 documents, by the early 1960s, however, it was common for 
Japanese employers to circumvent dismissals by using other means, such as reduction of 
working hours, relocation of regular employees, separation of non-regular employees, and the 
suspension of hiring new workers.  In the absence of statutory laws, what compelled 
management to protect employment of their workers in the face of declining sales and profits?     
The role of enterprise unions and the formation of case law provide key answers to this 
question.   
In exchange for their cooperation with management in rationalization and productivity 
improvements, enterprise unions demanded employment security of their members, i.e., all 
regular employees, as their first priority.  No explicit contractual guarantee of employment 
security, however, was found in union contracts.  Instead the contracts established a clause 
that required the employer’s prior consultation with a union in employment adjustment 
among other personnel issues.    Importantly, joint labor-management committees (roshi keiei 
kyogikai), which were widely introduced during the 1950s and 1960s, played a critical role in 
facilitating information sharing and joint consultation and establishing mutual trust between 
labor and management.  During business downturns, unions monitored managerial behavior 
and cooperated in transferring employees and soliciting early retirement.  Enterprise 
unionism thus became a central internal enforcement mechanism for the emerging lifetime 
employment practice in large firms.     14
14  
In a parallel development, starting in 1948 the Japanese courts began to rule 
increasingly in favor of employees in cases of dismissal (Sugeno 1992, pp.395-412; Tackney 
1995, pp.420-27).  Over the next three decades, the accumulation of judicial decisions 
gradually restricted the employer’s right to dismiss employees at will.
9  In particular, when 
the dismissals due to business conditions became a major issue during the Oil Crisis in the 
1970s, judicial decisions established minimum criteria that employers had to satisfy before 
resorting to dismissals, citing the “accepted idea of lifetime employment” and “existing ways 
of employment adjustment” (Sugeno 1992, p.408).
10  In other words, the interpretations of 
the law evolved endogenously to incorporate prevailing HRM practices and social 
expectations.    In turn, the accumulation of case law precedents reinforced the HRM practices 
and transformed expectations into social norms.  Since the late 1970s, the courts thus 
provided legal enforcement for lifetime employment to a certain degree, extending the 
practice to nonunion employers and smaller firms in the economy. 
 
3.3  The  High-Growth  Period 
The 1960s and the early half of 1970s are known as the “high-growth period.”  The period 
kickstarted from the “Income Doubling Plan” announced by the Ikeda cabinet in 1960, under 
which economic goals were set to more than double Japan’s GNP in the course of the next 
decade.  Actual results exceeded this as it took less than seven years to double personal 
incomes.  The real GDP growth rate during 1960-1973 averaged 10 percent, and this 
unprecedented achievement propelled Japan into the ranks of industrially advanced countries. 
                                                 
9 The 1975 Supreme Court decision established a principle that an exercise of the right of dismissal must be 
based on “reasonable grounds” to receive general social approval (Nihon Shokuen Seizo, April 25, 1975, 29 Civ. 
Cases 456). 
10 The 1979 court decision specified that employers had to (1) exhibit a high degree of business difficulties; (2) 
make effort to take other measures, such as transfers and voluntary retirement, before resorting to adjustment 
dismissals; (3) use objective and fair standards in selecting workers to be dismissed; and (4) engage in prior 
discussion with workers in good faith even if no such provision existed in union contracts (Sugeno 1992, pp.408-
9).   15
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Corporate profits soared under continuous periods of double-digit growth.  Rapid 
business expansion depleted the supply of labor available in urban centers, and large 
corporations aggressively recruited workers from rural areas.  These companies constructed 
dormitories and various housing facilities to accommodate the influx of the new workforce.  
Their employees began to develop the mentality that their jobs would be secure and their 
earnings would automatically increase with the length of service.  These expectations were 
fulfilled.  The main managerial concern was recruiting and preserving the workforce. 
Dismissal became a remote concept.    The practice flourished among large firms in the 1960s, 
and among smaller establishments in the 1970s.  Accordingly, turnover rates of 
manufacturing workers declined considerably (see Figure 1).  
Lifetime employment came into fruition under the favorable economic conditions of 
the high-growth period (Shimada 1994).  Sustained periods of economic growth allowed 
companies to project longer time horizons as economic conditions became more predictable.  
For employers, stable employment relationships enhanced the concept of investments in 
human capital, i.e., the recognition that workers are an important asset, or an investment with 
real  returns.   
Companies started to provide considerable education and training to their workers, and 
developed sophisticated human resource management systems for evaluation, promotion, and 
compensation.  For example, Koike (1997) documents how on-the-job training (OJT) 
became common practice among manufacturing firms in the late 1950s and 1960s.  A long-
term perspective shared by both labor and management was crucial for on-the-job training to 
be successful, because skill formation will be interrupted if the workers would move.  The 
bonus payment system, which covered white-collar and blue-collar employees in all job   16
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categories, also spread during the same period, primarily as an instrument to adjust wage 
levels in response to labor market and firm-specific conditions (Ohashi 1989).
11   
Labor-management relations also stabilized during the high-growth period as firms 
started to realize the gains from the human capital investment.    The annual private sector pay 
negotiations known as the Spring Offensive (shunto) was introduced in 1955.  The Spring 
Offensive suffered from low membership, and thus little bargaining power over management 
in its initial stages. However, sizable wage increases determined by the negotiations during 
the high-growth period led to larger membership, both with respect to the number of firms 
and workers.
12  An important outcome of the Spring Offensive was the standardization of 
wage increase demands and settlements. In a remarkable display of consensus building, 
member companies exchanged information to minimize wage dispersion, believing that 
harmonious labor relations was beneficial for labor and management.  Differences in wage 
increase settlements across firms and industries were common in the formative years of the 
Spring Offensive, but “virtually disappeared” during the mature period in the mid 1960s 
(Koshiro 2000).
13 
As expectations of employment security became reality, long-term employment 
became the norm governing the employment relationship in subsequent periods. Regular 
workers in large firms were increasingly attracted to the economic benefits of the renewed 
system – mainly “automatic” wage growth – which enabled them to smooth out their 
consumption and savings over a longer-time horizon.
14  They also enjoyed social benefits 
such as the status accorded to joining prestigious corporations.  Vogel (1963)’s reference to 
                                                 
11  The bonus system dates back to the prewar period, but its beneficiaries were mostly high ranking white-collar 
workers (Jones and Kato 1995). By 1985, 97 percent of firms that have 30 employees or more paid semiannual 
bonuses to their employees (Ministry of Labour statistics cited in Ohashi 1989). 
12  Membership increased from 730,000 in 1955 to 5.6 million in 1965 (Ministry of Labor statistics, cited in 
Takanashi 2002). 
13  For example, the coefficient of dispersion for wage increases was 0.29 in 1956 but fell below 0.1 in the 1960s 
(Ministry of Labor statistics, cited in Takanashi 2002). 
14  Inoki (2000) writes that by 1965, more than 95 percent of total households owned black-and-white television 
sets, and by 1970, 90 percent of households owned washing machines and refrigerators.   17
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Japan’s “new middle class” points precisely at this time period when the job of the salaryman 
characterized by security and prestige became a desirable status among the majority of the 
Japanese.   
Lifetime employment, however, also entailed the social costs.  Sanctions for 
deviating from the norm were met with certain penalties. The stigma attached to job changers 
hampered their chances of reemployment and resulted in their wage loss.
15  Job separations 
signaled a “lack of sincerity” much like a divorce (Dore 1983).  As commitment to the 
employer became customary, workers became reluctant to accept as social equals those 
individuals hired with prior job experience (Cole 1971b).  Large companies respected the 
implicit agreement and their employees were seldom dismissed.  However, as Crawcour 
(1978) explains, “when dismissal did occur it was an industrial death sentence with 
consequences far more severe than they would be in many other industrial societies” (p.240).   
Social pressures to conform to the norm thus functioned as a powerful enforcement 
mechanism for long-term employment. 
 
3.4  The  Oil  Crisis 
The stability of the employment relationship was seriously challenged with the First Oil 
Shock in 1973, followed by the Second Oil Shock in 1979.  Real GNP growth averaged 4.7 
percent between 1975 and 1980, and 3.7 percent between 1980 and 1985. Employers initially 
responded to the shock by upholding their renewed commitment to employment stability.  
Much like the methods used to adjust employment levels in the Occupation period (see Table 
2), dismissal was the last resort.  Instead, large and medium-sized firms made concerted 
efforts to reduce overtime, transfer workers within the firm, reduce new recruits, sell 
                                                 
15  Empirical studies of the Japanese labor market have found a negative correlation between the number of job 
changes and earnings.    See for example, Kato and Rockel (1992) and Ono (2004).     18
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corporate assets, cut executive bonuses and salaries, and cut dividends (Shimada 1979).
16  I n  
spite of these efforts, the shocks proved to be overburdening even for largest firms, forcing 
them ultimately to adjust their regular workforce mainly in the form of voluntary retirement 
and permanent transfers.    During December 1973 and February 1978, more than one million 
regular employees lost their jobs (Koshiro 1983).
17 
In response, there was an initial surge of labor disputes in 1974-75 involving more 
than 5.3 million workers (see Figure 2).    Several cases of dismissals were brought before the 
court, leading to the judiciary decisions that restricted the right of dismissals due to business 
conditions as discussed earlier.  Most enterprise unions, however, eventually approved 
employment adjustment plans and cooperated with management to carry them out.  Prior 
consultations at joint labor-management committees were particularly useful in facilitating 
labor-management cooperation during the crisis.  Furthermore, in 1975 the labor movement 
adopted a voluntary wage restraint policy intended to promote macroeconomic stability 
(Takanashi 2000).  In a move that reflected the high priority accorded to employment 
security, organized labor accepted a substantial reduction in real wages in the Spring 
Offensive of 1980 immediately following the Second Oil Shock (Shimada 1992).   
It is against this backdrop that the government launched the Employment Stability 
Project in 1977.  The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Trade and Industry were both 
determined to preserve employment security because they and the business community 
believed it was the key to industrial and social harmony (Cole 1979).  The objectives of the 
Project were twofold.  The first aim was to stabilize employment by transferring workers 
from declining industries to new more profitable lines of business.  Employers who were 
forced to temporarily lay off workers due to business fluctuations were offered rebates to 
                                                 
16  See Brunello (1988) for a detailed analysis concerning how employers used employee transfers during the 
First Oil Shock. 
17  However, the impact of the oil shock on employment adjustment was considerably smaller in Japan than in 
the U.S..: a comparative study revealed that the manpower reduction measured by the number of employees 
involved in Japan was only one third of that in the U.S. (Shinozuka 1978).   19
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transfer workers, often into newly established affiliates.
18  Second, the Project provided 
incentives for employers to keep their workers employed by subsidizing the costs involved 
with re-training workers in the skills necessary for new lines of business. Subsidies were also 
provided in circumstances where employers wished to implement short-time schedules, 
including those who were working zero hours or temporarily staying at home (Genda and 
Rebick 2000).  Hashimoto (1993) finds that the government-led employment stabilization 
movement reduced employment sensitivity to the business cycle, i.e., firms responded to 
business fluctuations mainly through adjustment of work hours rather than employment. 
It is often argued that Japan survived the Oil Crisis much better than their Western 
counterparts. Such views should not overlook the considerable measures undertaken by 
government, management, and labor to minimize the extent of the external shocks triggered 
by the oil crisis. As Shimada (1992) argues, the priority on employment stability established 
during the 1970s formed a backbone of the Japanese employment system in the subsequent 
decades. 
 
3.5    The Bubble Economy and Its Aftermath 
The conclusion of the Plaza Accords in September 1985 triggered a sharp appreciation of the 
yen relative to the dollar. During the next ten months, the value of the yen jumped from 240 
to 150 yen per dollar. The enormous price disadvantage of Japanese imports consequently led 
to a decline in product demand, and lifetime employment was once again tested as employers 
faced pressures to let workers go. However, the downturn was short-lived; the economy 
bottomed out by the end of 1986 and managed a quick recovery. The low-interest rate policy 
intended to stabilize macroeconomic performance soon led to aggressive corporate 
investments. Asset inflation, mainly through the appreciation of land and stock prices, 
                                                 
18  For example, the major shipbuilding firm, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries, established an affiliated 
firm specializing in designing sound reduction construction machinery. Other manufacturing firms also ventured 
into real estate and other service sector industries (Cole 1979).   20
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encouraged further investments. This upward spiral led to the so-called bubble economy 
(Noguchi 1994). 
The wealth effect stimulated consumer demand, and corporations responded by 
expanding their productive capacity. Employers hoarded labor at unprecedented levels. In 
previous episodes of expansion, employers exercised caution in hiring and recruiting, and 
adjusted to upward swings through overtime work. However, corporate confidence was high 
and the forecast so positive during the bubble years that corporations recruited as much labor 
as possible. The result was a complete turnaround, from a buyer’s market to a seller’s market. 
Labor shortage problems became pervasive especially among large firms who continued to 
hoard workers at an aggressive rate. The demand for college graduates was greater because 
firms desired a higher quality labor force, and because they were able to pay higher salaries. 
In the peak year of 1991, large firms with more than 1000 employees hired 145,600 new 
college graduates, or 64.7 percent of the total pool of college graduates, which represented a 
60 percent increase compared to the mid-1980s (Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa 2000).     
The prolonged period of asset inflation showed initial signs of collapse in 1991. By 
October, stock prices had fallen 50 percent from their 1989 peak.  In December, the 
Economic Planning Agency acknowledged that the economy had entered a slump. To deal 
with the recession, employers once again resorted to the conventional methods of adjustment, 
by reducing overtime work, reducing new hiring, transferring workers to subsidiaries, and 
encouraging early or voluntary retirement. Employee dismissal remained the last resort, but 
became inevitable.  Chuma (1994) claims that reductions in the core workforce started as 
early as the spring of 1993. 
The aftermath of the bubble economy dragged on as firms were confronted with not 
only a mountain of bad loans, but a mass of surplus labor.  Despite increasing pressures to 
let workers go, management continued to uphold the lifetime employment practice throughout   21
21  
the 1990s (Genda and Rebick 2000; Rebick 2001; Kato 2001).  Job retention rates and 
employment durations remained virtually unchanged in comparison to the 1980s.   
Management kept core employees employed by resorting to transfers, whether they be intra-
firm or to subsidiaries within a corporate group (Sako and Sato 1997; Kato 2001).  
Enterprise unions mainly negotiated wage increases that were in line with productivity gains, 
and their willingness to accept virtually no wage growth kept unemployment rates low in the 
1990s (Genda and Rebick 2000).  No major outbreak of labor disputes has been observed 
since the mid-1970s (see Figure 2).  On the other hand, repeated concessions signaled the 
union’s lack of bargaining power, leading many workers to see their unions as “powerless” 
(Kawakita 1997). 
Two forms of government intervention in the 1990s also contributed to the 
maintenance of employment security.  First, a new system was established in 1997 to 
provide special subsidies for job creation and skill formation in fifteen new growth areas, 
such as information technology and social welfare.    Second, the government paid employers 
direct subsidies to retain or employ older workers (Genda and Rebick 2000).    The system of 
deferred compensation implies that employees closer to a firm’s mandatory retirement age are 
paid more than their marginal product, which makes them more vulnerable to dismissals than 
younger workers.    Government subsidies were therefore targeted specifically to protect older 
workers during the economic downturn. 
The piecemeal adjustment to protect older workers had the undesirable consequence 
of depressing youth labor markets.  Kato (2001) finds that employment remained stable for 
core workers in the 1990s as reviewed previously, but less so for younger workers and 
middle-aged workers with short tenure. The primary cause of the problem was that employers, 
faced with the post-bubble surplus of labor, dramatically reduced their intakes of new hires 
(Rebick 1998).  Furthermore, labor hoarding during the bubble years left a diamond-shaped   22
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age composition of the workforce, with an overstock of workers in their thirties. This 
imbalanced age composition misaligned the system of internal promotion.  Eventually, the 
bulk of the bubble-cohort must be promoted, or it will demoralize subsequent cohorts.  
However, management faces a dilemma because the average quality of the bubble-cohort is 
likely to be lower than that of the subsequent cohorts due to the lower recruiting standards 
used during the period (Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa 2000).  The lack of organizational 
restructuring has therefore worsened the labor market conditions for younger employees. 
Their promotion rates have slowed down, and their training opportunities within firms have 
been depressed (Genda 2000). 
 
4.    The Future of the Lifetime Employment System 
In the midst of the longest economic stagnation in the nation’s history, doubts about 
the future of lifetime employment have surfaced once again and continue to captivate the 
public’s attention. A February 2002 survey by Nikkei Research reported that over half of 800 
firms surveyed “could no longer sustain” permanent employment practices.
19  In the 
business community, Matsushita’s announcement of 8,000 job cuts through voluntary layoffs 
during fiscal year 2002 was received as a turning point in Japanese industrial relations.
20  
Matsushita, in both its organization and history, represents a microcosm of the Japanese firm, 
often credited as the first to effectively implement lifetime employment.  Its announcement 
was an impetus for change, as it triggered an avalanche of corporate downsizing plans among 
other Japanese companies.  As of November 2001, 82 firms had announced plans to 
discharge a total of 120,000 workers by fiscal year 2004.
21  Is this the end of Japanese 
                                                 
19  A survey of 805 firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange and JASDAQ reported in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
February 26, 2002. 
20  This view has been popularized in the media. See for example, a Nihon Keizai Shimbun article entitled “Can 
Matsushita Come Back?” (August 4, 2001). 
21  Nihon Keizai Shimbun (European Edition), November 18, 2001.   23
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lifetime employment?    Or will the practice maintain its resilience and resurge once economic 
conditions  recover?   
There is some evidence suggesting that employment adjustments in the 2000s may be 
tougher than in the previous decades.    Conventional measures of employment adjustment are 
becoming more difficult to implement.    Reassigning or transferring workers to other parts of 
the business may no longer be a viable solution.  Smaller firms that serve on the receiving 
end of surplus workers from large companies are getting saturated with workers; moreover, 
they face hardship themselves, and can no longer absorb such “redundancies from above” 
(Ono 2002).    Early or voluntary retirement risks adverse selection, i.e. management may lose 
high-ability workers instead of the targeted low-ability workers. Further, early retirement is 
likely a bad deal for the average worker.    Studies have shown that, in many cases, the lump-
sum compensation offered through these plans would not compensate for the loss in earnings 
when viewed over a lifetime (Ichinose 2001). 
Despite increasing pressures to reduce redundant labor, recent survey results confirm 
that dismissal of regular employees continues to be the last resort among Japanese firms (see 
Table 3).  The Japan Institute of Labor (2001b) reports that preferences for employment 
adjustments among Japanese employers have changed little.    Maintaining a reserve of excess 
labor under economic duress, however, is not without its costs. Ono and Rebick (2003) 
estimate that the quantity of surplus labor retained among Japanese employers is around 5 
percent of total employment, or about the same as the unemployment rate in 2002.  The 
impact of this efficiency loss on labor productivity is certainly not negligible.  Further, as 
discussed previously, the burden of protecting the core workforce falls disproportionately on 
younger workers. In March 2002, the unemployment rate among workers between the ages of 
15 to 29 recorded 9.6 percent, in comparison to the nation’s average of 5.2 percent.   24
24  
One obvious prescription is a more flexible labor market. But the Japanese labor 
market that matured under the premise of lifetime employment has yet to develop an 
infrastructure that facilitates an efficient reallocation of workers across corporate boundaries.  
Table 4 shows the top five reasons why workers do not, or cannot change jobs.    The reasons 
accentuate the sentiments of many Japanese workers who feel “stuck” with their current 
employers.  The  internal  labor  markets  that  presume entry from below impedes the mobility 
of workers who are separated from their firms in mid-career (Ono and Rebick 2003; Recruit 
Works Institute 2001).  Older workers are more likely to be endowed with higher levels of 
firm-specific skills, and by definition, this makes it more difficult to transfer their skills to 
other firms.  The seniority-plus-merit pay makes it even harder for workers to leave their 
employers because it likely results in wage loss.  Hence, it is an equilibrium for mid-career 
workers to remain with their current employers; they don’t want to quit their firms and other 
firms don’t want to hire them. 
A notable example of employers’ aversion to older workers is found in job postings 
where employers explicitly impose age restrictions on their new hires. In 1999, over 90 
percent of Japanese firms were found to impose age limits – generally 35 to 40 – on their job 
openings (Japan Institute of Labor 2001c).  This so-called “age limit” problem continues to 
be the most common reason for workers not changing jobs in the Japanese labor market (see 
Table 4).  Under pressure for reform, the government introduced guidelines to abolish age 
limits in recruiting and hiring in October 2001 as part of the revised Employment Measures 
Law. However, the guidelines specify ten exceptions where age restrictions are acceptable. 
One of the exceptions is phrased almost specifically to prevent disruptions in the seniority 
system.
22  As it stands, the guidelines are mainly viewed as a cosmetic gesture, and their 
                                                 
22  Exception 4 in the guideline reads: “Cases where recruiting or hiring is intended for workers under a certain 
age in situations where, in order to make wage payments regardless of age to new employees, companies will be 
required to revise present regulations determining wages mainly in accordance with age” (Japan Institute of 
Labor (2001a)).   25
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immediate impact on job mobility remains questionable.  In short, a labor market for job 
changers has not yet developed in Japan, without which the worker with general human 
capital will suffer severe penalties from job separations. 
Finally, the long-term threat which not only may undermine the employment system 
but economic growth itself is Japan’s aging population.  The rate of aging in Japan is the 
fastest in the world, compounded by longer life expectancy and lower fertility.  The 
implications for the economy are ominous.  The aging population will eventually lead to an 
inverted pyramid shaped age composition of the workforce and increase the burden for the 
active labor force to support the private and public pension system.  To summarize, the 
Japanese labor market faces a labor surplus problem in the short-run, and a labor shortage 
problem in the long-run.    These problems are yet to find solutions. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examined the historical process in which Japanese lifetime employment was 
shaped and became institutionalized over the past century as a result of the dynamic 
interactions among labor, management, and government.    Pioneered by leading firms during 
the interwar period, the lifetime employment practice matured into a cluster of HRM policies, 
diffused to a wider set of firms, became more deeply institutionalized, and was increasingly 
socially-embedded at each historical event examined in our paper.  In particular, we 
documented the endogenous formation of macro-level institutions that reinforced the lifetime 
employment practice.  The development of state welfare policies, enterprise unions, case 
laws, government subsidies, and social norms are primary examples of such institutions.    We 
argued that the practice’s remarkable stability and resilience to economic shocks cannot be 
explained without the existence of these complementary institutions. 
What does the history tell us about the future of Japanese lifetime employment?  So 
far the system has emerged from each economic shock by consolidating itself more firmly   26
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with necessary adjustments and innovations.  As long as the complementary institutions 
continue to support it, lifetime employment will likely persist.    But should it change?   
According to our analysis, the shift from spot labor markets to long-term employment 
was initially driven by efficiency considerations.    By achieving greater productivity through 
higher human capital, it produced benefits to both management and labor in the form of 
higher profit and greater employment security.  The government endorsed the corporate 
practices as it brought about economic development and industrial peace at a relatively low 
social welfare cost to the state.  However, the efficiency of lifetime employment is by no 
means guaranteed: it depends on several key parameters, most importantly, the growth rate of 
the firm, the nature of human capital, and labor market conditions.  In particular, during the 
high-growth period and again in the bubble economy, under the economic conditions 
favorable to management, the lifetime employment practice was extended to a much wider 
segment of the economy with perhaps little gain in long-run economic efficiency.  Once 
extended, labor’s oppositions, government regulatory support, and court decisions tended to 
make it difficult to reverse the practice.  Even for elite corporations, core proponents and 
traditional mainstay of lifetime employment, an increasing importance of professional 
occupations with general human capital may limit the returns from lifetime employment.    In 
general, in evaluating the future economic implications of the system, one must discern long-
run trends in the key parameters.     
Furthermore, after several decades since its inception, lifetime employment has 
become deeply embedded in the society, inseparably integrated into political, legal, and social 
institutions.  As such, the continuation of the system is no longer dictated by its firm-level 
efficiency concerns.  For example, as employment security became a norm and a 
fundamental premise upon which the society is built, the social benefits of employment 
security are far greater than its direct economic benefits.    The system, however, also created   27
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social costs that were originally unforeseen.  For instance, lifetime employment produced a 
stark status difference between regular and non-regular workers, promoted occupational 
segregation by gender between career and non-career jobs, and brought about high 
unemployment for the young and the old during recessions.  In other words, it is important 
also to evaluate the social implications of lifetime employment which go far beyond the 
original efficiency implications. 
To give careful assessment of the social and economic implications of Japanese 
lifetime employment is beyond the scope of this paper.    By providing a historical perspective, 
however, this paper underscores the importance of understanding the dynamic process that 
shaped the practice and the complementarity between the corporate HRM practices and 
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Sources: (a) 1923-1936: Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo Iinkai (1959), Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo (Historical 
Data of Japanese Labor Movement), vol.10; (b) 1937-40: Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyusho (1964), 
Taiheiyo Sensoka no Rodosha Jotai (Labor Conditions during the Pacific War); (c) 1948-2002: 
Rodosho, Maitsuki Kinro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labor Survey).  
Notes: 
1) Separation rates (%) are annualized.  Monthly separation rate is defined by the number of 
employees separated from an establishment (voluntary quits, layoffs, and discharges) within a month 
divided by the number of employees at the end of the previous month. 
2) In (a), the surveys covered production workers in manufacturing establishments employing 50 or 
more regular production workers. In (c), the surveys covered regular employees (blue-collar and 
white-collar employees) in manufacturing establishments with 30 or more regular employees.  



























Sources: (a) 1921-1946: Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo Iinkai (1959), Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo (Historical 
Data of Japanese Labor Movement), vol.10;  (b) 1947-2001: Rodosho, Rodo Kumiai Kihon Chosa 
(Labor Union Basic Survey) and Rodo Sogi Tokei Chosa (Labor Disputes Statistics), various years. 
Notes: 
1) Trade union membership as of the end of June each year is reported.  
2) Union density (%) is the union membership divided by the total number of employees in June each 
year reported in Rodoryoku Chosa (Labor Force Survey) by the Bureau of Statistics. 
3) Working days lost is defined by the number of working days lost due to labor disputes accompanied 
by strikes and lockouts that lasted longer than half a day.  
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Table 1. Corporate Welfare Programs in 1949 
 






Company Housing  58.7 96.3 82.4  54.8 
Dining Facilities  21.5 72.2 37.6  14.7 
Company Loan  9.4 31.9 14.6 6.8 
Medical Clinic  18.4 96.6 43.5 7.6 
Health & Safety  50.1 94.6 75.4  41.0 
Recreation Programs  26.4 77.4 50.4  17.3 
Athletic Facilities  22.0 87.7 46.9  11.8 
 
Source: Rodosho (1960), Rodo Gyoseishi (History of Labor Administration), Vol.2, p.1540. 





Table 2. Employment Adjustments during Business Downturns 
in 1954-55 and 1962-63 
 
Method of Employment Adjustment  1954-55  1962-63 
Reduction of Working Hours  48 51 
Relocation of Regular Workers  25 31 
No Contract Renewals of Temporary Workers  19 13 
Reduction of Outside Workers  3 14 
No Hiring of New Workers  10 23 




Source: Tsuda, Masumi (1968), Nenkoteki Roshi Kankei-ron (Seniority-based Labor-Management 
Relations), p.174. 
Notes: Percentage of firms using each method is reported. One firm may use more than one method. 
The survey covered firms with 30 or more regular workers in mining, manufacturing and 




Table  3.  Methods  of  Employment Adjustment in 2000 
Adjustment Method  % 
Restricting overtime work  11 
Reassigning workers to other parts of the business  7 
Temporary transfer (shukko)  5 
Reducing (or stopping) mid-year intakes of new employees  4 
Increasing holiday leave and days-off  2 
Dismissing part-time and temporary workers  2 
Dismissing or calling for the voluntary retirement of regular employees  2 
 





Table 4.    Top Five Reasons Why Workers Don’t Change Jobs in 2001 
Reason % 
I exceed the age limit of the job postings  40.8 
My work experience is not transferable to the general society 23.4 
Returns to seniority will be lost and I will suffer wage loss  21.8 
I do not know how to look for jobs  19.1 
I will lose personal contacts established through my work  14.1 
 
Source: Recruit Works Institute (2001) Working Persons Chosa 2000: Shutoken (Working 
Persons Survey 2000: The Greater Tokyo Area).   
 
 
 
 